It has been suggested that mental states play an important Both patient groups exhibited significantly impaired performance on the two theory of mind measures. Both role in determining behaviour and that mental state attributions ('theory of mind') underlie the ability to frontal lobe groups also exhibited a range of deficits in tests of executive functions, but analyses revealed that understand and predict other peoples' behaviour. Theory of mind was investigated in 31 patients with unilateral these seemed to be independent of theory of mind impairments. These findings are discussed in terms of frontal lobe lesions (15 right-sided and 16 left-sided) by comparing their performance with that of 31 matched the hypothesis of a specialized, adaptive brain system underlying theory of mind reasoning ability, and are control subjects. The ability to infer first-and secondorder beliefs was tested by requiring subjects to listen to related to observed difficulties in social functioning among patients with frontal lobe damage. stories in which a protagonist acted upon a false belief.
Introduction
Impairment in social cognition has long been recognized as impaired social behaviour demonstrate, but only minor impairment on standard neuropsychological tests, including a commonly observed effect of frontal lobe damage. In particular, case studies such as those of patients A. (Brickner, those held to be sensitive to frontal lobe dysfunction. An alternative approach to this problem may be found in 1936), K.M. (Hebb, 1945) , J.P. (Ackerly and Benton, 1948) , E.V.R. (Eslinger and Damasio, 1985) , D.T. (Eslinger et al., investigations of impaired social cognition in individuals with autism. In this field of research, the concept of a 'theory 1992) and G.K. and M.H. (Price et al., 1990) have provided rich and striking descriptions of a seemingly heterogeneous of mind' (ToM) has been developed ( Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Leslie, 1987) . ToM refers to the ability to represent array of behavioural changes associated with social difficulties. These include insensitivity to social cues, mental states, such as beliefs and intentions, and is distinct from the ability to represent 'real' states of affairs. It enables egocentrism, indifference to the opinions of others, lack of restraint, diminished foresight, impaired self-monitoring, a us to make attributions and to reason about mental states and, in doing so, to understand and predict the behaviour of tendency to exhibit inappropriate affect, and social withdrawal.
other people (Premack and Woodruff, 1978) . Although this general topic has a long history (Baldwin, The underlying cognitive mechanisms and neuroanatomical correlates of social behaviour are largely unknown and so 1897; Piaget, 1955; Premack and Woodruff, 1978) , interest in ToM is largely due to the assertion that an impairment such deficits have remained difficult to categorize and quantify. Many patients with frontal lobe damage exhibit in social cognition, caused by a specific deficit in an independent, innate module underlying the development of a simple first-order and second-order ToM test and impairment only on a 'faux pas' test in a subgroup of five subjects with ToM, is responsible for the core deficits in autism (BaronCohen et al., 1985; Leslie, 1987) . Using the classic 'false more extensive lesions incorporating bilateral orbitofrontal cortex (Stone et al., 1998) . belief' paradigm devised by Wimmer and Perner to investigate ToM development in normal children (Wimmer In the present study, the group of patients with frontal lobe excisions was sufficiently large and varied, in terms and Perner, 1983), Baron-Cohen and colleagues found that autistic children failed to predict accurately the action of of site and size of lesions, for it to be feasible to look for effects of size, region and laterality of the lesions on a protagonist directly after being provided with information that implied strongly that the protagonist held a mistaken ToM test performance. In addition to the tests of executive functions, the experimental design belief (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) . Subsequent studies have provided empirical support for impaired ToM in autism.
incorporated a number of other measures with which to constrain interpretations of ToM test performance. Measures However, the notion of a specific, independent cognitive deficit underlying these problems has been challenged.
internal to the false belief test included the standard control questions to check comprehension and memory for Executive dysfunction in autism has been reported (Steel et al., 1984; Rumsey, 1985; Rumsey and Hamburger, 1988, story details. As patients with right hemisphere damage (RHD) are thought to fail ToM tests because of a type 1990), and there has been debate about the relationship between executive dysfunction, ToM deficits and their of pragmatic impairment other than a difficulty in conceptualizing another person's mental state (Siegal et al., primacy in autism and the relationship between frontal lobe damage and autism (Ozonoff et al., 1991a, b; Hughes 1996) , questions designed to elicit inferences other than mental state inferences were also included. This provided and Russell, 1993) .
It is possible that ToM and executive functions are an opportunity to examine the relationship between performance on these questions and the ToM test questions, independent and are associated in autism only because of proximity of the respective underlying neuroanatomical which are essentially questions requiring references about mental states. Thus, the study was designed to determine systems. However, other possibilities exist. ToM may be a primary deficit, with failure in the development of ToM whether first-and second-order ToM is impaired after prefrontal lesions and to examine the nature of any such impeding the development of executive control. Alternatively, executive dysfunction may result in a secondary deficit in impairments, in particular to determine their relationship to impairments on standard tests of executive functions. the ability to exert control over one's own mental states. Hughes and Russell favour the latter alternative (Hughes and Russell, 1993) . They acknowledge the likelihood of a real impairment in the ability to 'mentalise' in autism, but they
Methods
argue that ToM tests are simply types of executive functioning tests, i.e. impaired performance reflects deficits in general
Subjects
The subjects for this study included 31 adult neurosurgical problem-solving skills, such as cognitive flexibility and response inhibition. The difficulty with this proposal is that patients with unilateral frontal lobe lesions who had undergone surgery at King's Neurosciences Centre, London individuals with Asperger's syndrome (AS), a mild subtype in the spectrum of autistic disorders, exhibit executive (formerly the Maudsley Hospital Neurosurgical Unit, London). Only patients with lesions exclusive to the frontal dysfunction and yet are able to solve ToM problems (Ozonoff et al., 1991b) . However, the extent to which the finding of lobes were selected, and these lesions were identified and verified using the neurosurgeon's drawings and notes made Ozonoff and colleagues can be regarded as conclusive is unclear because it contrasts with their own observation that at the time of operation, and neuroimages produced by preand postoperative CT scanning and MRI. The neurosurgeon's people with AS fail to display any use of ToM ability in informal conversation.
drawings made after examination of these documents, which depict the site and extent of the lesions, are shown in Figs 1 The study reported here investigated the relationship between ToM ability and executive functioning by examining and 2. Patients gave informed consent and the study was approved by The Institute of Psychiatry Bethlam and the performance of a large group of patients with focal lesions of the frontal lobes on a false belief test and a range Maudsley Trust Ethical Committee. The patients were tested a minimum of 3 months of tests of executive functions. An association between some executive functions and social competence, assessed using a postoperatively (mean 77 months, SD 60 months). Fifteen patients (six males and nine females) had right frontal lobe self-report inventory, has been reported in such groups (Grattan et al., 1994) . Furthermore, studies using functional lesions and 16 (eight males and eight females) had left frontal lesions. In the right frontal lobe (RF) group, eight patients neuroimaging to investigate ToM ability indicate that the prefrontal cortex is critically involved (Baron-Cohen et al., had a resection or a lobectomy incorporating an eliptogenic focus to treat pharmacologically intractable epilepsy, five had 1994; Fletcher et al., 1995; Goel et al., 1995) . However, in the first group study of ToM in 10 subjects with frontal lobe a tumour removed (four had a meningioma excised and one had an ogliodendroglioma excised), and two had a right damage, Stone and colleagues reported high performance on anterior communicating artery (ACoA) aneurysm clipped right dorsolateral 9; right medial 9; right orbital 9; left dorsolateral 7; left medial 14; left orbital 15. following rupture and subarachnoid haemorrhage (SAH). Of the left frontal lobe (LF) group, six patients had a resection
The performance of the frontal experimental groups was compared with that of 31 healthy control subjects who had or a lobectomy to relieve pharmacologically intractable epilepsy, five had a tumour excised (three cases of reported having no history of psychiatric or neurological disease. They were recruited to match the frontal experimental meningioma and two cases of ogliodendroglioma), and two had a left ACoA aneurysm clipped after rupture and SAH.
groups for sex, age, education and premorbid Full Scale IQ, as estimated by the National Adult Reading Test-Revised A further two left frontal patients had a space-occupying haematoma evacuated (one subdural and one extradural) and (Nelson and Willison, 1991) (Table 2) . One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) confirmed that the three groups were cranial repair following focal head injury, and one other patient had a partial lobectomy to treat a cerebral abscess.
well matched in terms of age [F(2,59) A battery of standardized neuropsychological tests was into which the lesions encroached (Table 1) . These were defined anatomically as dorsolateral (Brodmann areas 9 and administered to all subjects (Tables 3 and 7) . These were chosen to measure intellectual function, memory and 46), medial (Brodmann areas 8, 9 and 10) and orbital (Brodmann areas 10, 11, 12 and 25) . Only eight patients had executive functioning, both to provide background information on the patients and to explore the extent to lesions confined within a single sector. Classification was, therefore, based upon the number of patients with lesions which putative ToM deficits could be attributed to basic forms of cognitive impairment. The three groups did not that extended into a specific sector. The numbers of patients with lesions involving each given sector were as follows:
differ significantly in terms of current (pro-rated) Verbal 
Theory of mind test
questions. In order to answer these questions you will need To test ToM, stories were constructed about characters to think about what has happened in the story and then draw involved in routine activities, with implications regarding the your own conclusions.' protagonist's false belief, and were followed by a series of The stories and questions were then presented orally and questions. They were designed to test the ability to solve responses were recorded. problems involving either (i) first-order attributions of false belief (of the form 'A thinks X'), or (ii) second-order attributions of false belief (of the form 'A thinks B thinks X').
Executive functioning
A total of 12 stories were constructed, six for the firstIn order to investigate the relationship between putative ToM order false belief test and six for the second-order false belief impairment and executive functions, a set of tests of executive test. The topics for the stories were finding a parking space, functioning was administered, covering four main areas: (i) going to a restaurant, borrowing library books, paying a bill, cognitive initiation or selection was tested with the Controlled doing housework, having the car serviced, being discharged Oral Word Association Test (Spreen and Benton, 1977) , using from hospital, getting up in the morning, doing some F, A and S as the cue letters; (ii) response inhibition/interference redecorating, arranging a surprise party, going on holiday was assessed with the Stroop Test (Stroop, 1935 ; Trenerry and going grocery shopping. Each story was followed by a et al., 1989); (iii) mental flexibility was assessed with both ToM test question and three control questions.
the Trail-Making Test (Reitan and Wolfson, 1993) and the (i) False belief test question. This was designed to elicit a Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) (Heaton, 1981) ; and response that demonstrated the ability to make inferences (iv) monitoring and organization were assessed with a simple about another individual's mental state, namely, that a experimental test-a verbal, externally orderedtask adapted protagonist held a false belief.
from Petrides and colleagues (Petrides et al., 1993) . (ii) Inference question. The aim of this question was to assess the ability to draw inferences that did not involve reasoning about another individual's mental state. (iii) Fact question. This was posed to determine whether
Memory
To determine whether verbal memory impairment was a subjects had understood relevant events that, in actuality, stood in contrast to others and, in doing so, implied the false causative factor in terms of ToM impairment, the Wechsler Memory Scale (Wechsler, 1945) Logical Memory test of belief of the protagonist. three groups showed a highly significant difference [F(2,59) ϭ 21.15, P Ͻ 0.0001]. Post hoc comparisons between the individual group pairings were made using the least squares difference (LSD) method. This showed that the RF group's performance did not differ significantly from that of the LF group, but that overall percentage correct scores for both patient groups were significantly lower than that of the control group.
Each incorrect response was categorized as one of four types of error. (i) In 'Incorrect Belief Attribution', the subject made a belief attribution, but in a mistaken fashion so that it provided an inadequate explanation. For example, an attribution about Attribution', the subject failed to explain the behaviour of the protagonist in terms of their mistaken belief, but merely prose recall was administered. Working memory/attentional inferred another mental state appropriate to the scenario. (iii) impairment was screened for with the Digit Span subtest of 'Incorrect Mental State Attribution' was similar to (ii), but the WAIS-R.
the mental state inference was about the wrong character in the story or was not appropriate to the scenario. In other words, it was irrelevant to the story. (iv) An 'Inappropriate
Integration/sequencing
Response' was, for example, a response that reiterated the In order to control for possible differences in the ability to facts of the story without attempting to answer the question integrate and sequence material, the Picture Arrangement appropriately. subtest of the WAIS-R was also administered.
In order to establish the reliability of response scoring and categorization, all responses for 28 of the subjects were rated independently by two people, one of whom had no knowledge Design of the group to which the subjects belonged. Overall, there The background neuropsychological tests and the was 98% inter-rater agreement. experimental test were administered in the same fixed order.
The proportions of errors for the different categories were However, within the experimental test, the presentation of calculated, and are shown in Table 4 . In the RF group, the first-and second-order false belief stories was alternated and Inappropriate Response category accounted for the largest blocked into four sets, each consisting of three stories. Each proportion of errors, and the Correct Mental State Attribution set was, therefore, made up of either two first-order false category for the next lowest proportion. A very similar belief stories and one second-order false belief story or two pattern was seen for the LF group. For the control group, second-order false belief stories and one first-order false the number of errors was so small overall that it made the belief story. In order to counterbalance the presentation of pattern less reliable, but the Inappropriate Response and the different story sets, a 4 ϫ 4 Latin square was used and Correct Mental State Attribution categories also accounted repeated across each subject group. In a further attempt to for the highest proportions of errors. offset any learning effects, the background tests were slotted between set presentations, following a fixed format, such that 
Theory of mind
correct score for the LF group was significantly lower than In an initial analysis, the responses to the ToM questions that of the control group; this was the only significant were scored as correct if the subject made an appropriate difference between the individual groups. and correct first-order belief attribution (in the form 'A thinks X' or 'A does not know Y'), or incorrect, if no appropriate belief attribution was made. A correct response was scored Fact question. The responses were defined as correct or incorrect. The percentage correct scores are given in Fig. 4 . 1 and an incorrect response 0; the scores were averaged across stories and transformed into an overall percentage ANOVA revealed no significant difference between the groups overall. correct score (Fig. 3) . A one-way ANOVA comparing the Proportion of all responses shown in parentheses. NC ϭ normal controls.
Fig. 4
Performance on first-order false belief control questions. Covariate analysis. In order to determine whether the analyses with LSD tests revealed that the overall scores for ability to draw inferences from the stories, to understand the two patient groups were not significantly different, but facts or to remember material affected the ability to answer that the scores for the RF and LF groups were both the ToM questions, the ToM data were subjected to analysis significantly lower than that of the control group. of covariance in which the measures relating to these variables Eight error categories were used to classify the incorrect were controlled. When the inference question measure was responses for second-order stories. (i) In 'Incorrect Secondcovaried, the overall difference between the groups remained Order Belief Attribution', a belief attribution taking the form highly significant [F(2,58) ϭ 19.35, P Ͻ 0.0001]. This was of an embedded representation (of the form 'A thinks B also true for the fact [F(2,58) ϭ 18.98, P Ͻ 0.0001] and doesn't know X') was made, but was incorrect. This was memory question measures [F(2,58) ϭ 21.12, P Ͻ 0.0001].
either because the facts of the attribution were wrong or Post hoc comparisons were also made between the individual because the attribution was not addressed to the relevant group pairings, in which a stringent Bonferroni correction story character. (ii) In 'Correct First-Order Belief Attribution', (Holmes, 1979) was applied. (For all post hoc comparisons the subject made a belief attribution of the form 'A thinks X' a stringent Bonferroni correction was applied in which the or 'A doesn't know Y'. This can be regarded as superficially statistical significance level of P ϭ 0.05 was halved for every correct, but it fails to demonstrate an understanding of the comparison, providing a P value of 0.006.) In each case, the rationale for the belief, even though this is strongly implied ToM deficit in the performance of the two patient groups, in the story. (iii) 'Incorrect First-Order Belief Attribution' relative to that of the control group, remained highly corresponded to the first error category for responses to significant (P Ͻ 0.0001).
first-order ToM stories (as incorrect belief attribution). (iv) 'Correct Second-Order Mental State Attribution' took a form similar to (i) but referred to a mental state other than the
Second-order theory of mind
implied belief (e.g. a desire) of one of the characters in the story as an explanation (e.g. ' A thinks B wants X'). (v)
Theory of mind
The responses to the ToM questions for the second-order 'Incorrect Second-Order Mental State Attribution' took the same form as (iv) but was incorrect because the attribution stories, like those for the first-order stories, were scored as correct (in the form of e.g. 'A thinks B doesn't know X' or was not to the relevant character, or the details of the responses to the ToM questions for 28 of the subjects were High 16 6 10 graded independently, as described above for first-order ToM responses. There was 97% agreement on these ratings.
For first-order ToM stories, mean number of correct first-order belief attributions ϭ 3.45, therefore frontal subjects who scored ഛ3 large. Again, the overall number of errors for the control group was much smaller and so the pattern was less reliable, but the highest and only conspicuous proportion was for the groups were collapsed to form one group. The mean number of Correct First-Order Belief Attributions scored for the six Correct First-Order Belief Attribution category.
In both the RF and LF groups, the proportion of responses first-order ToM stories was then calculated (3.45) and used to define performance levels as high (score ജ4) or low (score classified as Correct First-Order Belief Attributions for the first-order ToM stories (RF ϭ 56.67%; LF ϭ 61.46%) was ഛ3). The mean score for responses classified as Correct Second-Order and First-Order Belief Attributions for the six similar to the combined proportions of responses categorized as Correct First-Order Belief Attributions and Correct Secondsecond-order ToM stories was also calculated (3.23), and this was used to define performance levels for false belief Order Belief Attributions for the second-order ToM stories (RF ϭ 57.78%; LF ϭ 55.20%; these data refer to the attributions on the second-order ToM stories as high (score ജ4) or low (score ഛ3). The number of frontal subjects proportions shown in Fig. 5 and the proportions of errors categorized as Correct First-Order False Belief Attributions scoring within these categories (those defined as high-level performers and those defined as low-level performers) on the shown in Table 5 ). The following calculations and comparisons were made in order to investigate the extent to first-and second-order ToM stories are shown in Table 6 . This reveals that there was a substantial degree of overlap; which these proportions represented responses for the same subgroups within the main groups. First, the two frontal the patient's performance levels for false belief attribution to order of presentation, such that three values were obtained for both first-order and second-order ToM stories (for the first and second, the third and fourth, and the fifth and sixth stories of each type presented). Using the Friedman test, no significant practice effects were found in any of the three groups. However, a trend on the second-order ToM stories for only the RF group [χ 2 (2) ϭ 5.00, P ϭ 0.08] was examined further. Wilcoxon tests revealed that, although there were no significant differences between the values that represented collapsed scores for the third and fourth and the fifth and sixth second-order ToM stories presented, the value for the first and second stories presented was significantly lower than the values for scores on the third and fourth (Z ϭ Fig. 6 Performance on second-order false belief control questions.
-1.99, P Ͻ 0.05) and the fifth and sixth stories presented
Stippled columns ϭ normal controls; black columns ϭ LF; cross (Zϭ -2.24, P Ͻ 0.05).
hatched columns ϭ RF.
on first-order ToM stories tended to be predictive of their
Executive functioning
The performance data for the three groups on the tests of performance level for false belief attributions on secondorder ToM stories.
executive functioning are shown in Figure 6 shows the percentage correct scores. Overall, there was a significant difference between the groups revealed that the two frontal groups performed significantly less well than the control subjects. There was also a significant [F(2,59) ϭ 4.45, P Ͻ 0.05]. Again, post hoc LSD tests revealed that the percentage correct score for the LF group difference between groups on the Stroop test [F(2,59) ϭ 7.34, P Ͻ 0.005]; the LSD tests showed that only the was significantly lower than that of the control group, and that this was the only significant group difference.
performance of the LF group was impaired relative to the control group, and that the LF group also performed significantly worse than the RF group. The data for the
Fact question. Figure 6 shows the percentage correct scores for the three groups. ANOVA showed no significant alphabetical sequencing component (Part A) of the TrailMaking Test revealed an overall group effect [F(2,59) ϭ differences overall.
9.99, P Ͻ 0.0005]; LSD tests showed that both patient groups performed significantly less well than the control group. For
Memory question. The percentage correct scores are given in Fig. 6 . ANOVA showed that there were no significant the set-shifting component of the Trail-Making Test (Part B), there was also a group effect [F(2,59) ϭ 3.41, P Ͻ 0.05], differences between the groups. but only the LF group were impaired in comparison with the control group. For the WCST, there was a significant
Covariate analysis. In new analyses, by covarying measures of ability to draw inferences and to understand and difference between groups in the Number of Categories achieved [F(2,59) ϭ 3.19, P Ͻ 0.05], but only the LF group remember details from the second-order stories, the extent to which these factors could account for ability to answer performing significantly less well than the control group. There was a group trend for the Percentage of Perseverative ToM questions was examined. The overall difference between the groups remained highly significant when covarying the Errors score [F(2,59) ϭ 2.50, P ϭ 0.09], and the LSD analysis again indicated a performance deficit in only the LF inference question [F(2,58) ϭ 17.90, P Ͻ 0.0001], the fact question [F(2,58) ϭ 22.66, P Ͻ 0.0001] and the memory group relative to the control group. The Failure to Maintain Mental Set score did not differentiate the groups. For the question measure [F(2,58) ϭ 24.48, P Ͻ 0.0001]. Post hoc analyses, in which Bonferroni correction was applied, Externally Ordered task, there was a significant effect of group [F(2,59) ϭ 7.30, P Ͻ 0.005]; both frontal groups revealed that the deficit in the performance of the RF and LF groups, compared with the control group, remained highly performed significantly worse than the control subjects. significant in each case (P Ͻ 0.0001).
Memory
The average score for the Wechsler Memory Scale Logical
Effects of practice
In order to study the effects of practice, within each group Memory Test was computed. There was no significant group effect [F(2,59) ϭ 0.90], indicating an absence of impairment the scores for the ToM questions were collapsed according in the patient groups. For Digit Span, there was a significant of Categories achieved measure, a significant contribution to the variance was found only in the comparisons between the difference between the groups [F(2,59) ϭ 5.15, P Ͻ 0.01]; LSD tests showed that the performance of both patient groups LF and control groups [Stroop, F(1, 45) and memory as covariates comparison with the controls, made significant individual To determine whether the impairment in ToM could be contributions to this variance. related to the executive functioning or memory impairments, the ToM data were re-analysed using the executive functioning and memory measures as covariates.
Second-order theory of mind
The main effect of group for the second-order ToM data also remained highly significant (P Ͻ 0.0001) when re-analysed
First-order theory of mind
For all the analyses with executive functioning measures, the with the executive functioning measures as covariates. This was also the case in post hoc comparisons between individual main effect of group for the ToM data remained highly significant (P Ͻ 0.0001). Similarly, comparisons between groups with the Bonferroni correction. In the main analyses, the WCST Percentage of Perseverative Errors scores individual groups using the stringent Bonferroni correction continued to show highly significant differences between [F(1,58) See footnote to Table 8 for definitions of performance levels. Mean Mean numbers of correct belief attributions (first order 3.45, second order 1.55) were used to classify subjects scoring below the mean as size of lesions was used to classify subjects with small lesions (ഛ3 cm) and subjects with large lesions (Ͼ3 cm). performing at a low level and subjects scoring above the mean as performing at a high level. at a high or low level according to whether they scored above or below the relevant mean. With subjects reassigned to the variance were found in the main analyses of secondorder ToM or in post hoc comparisons between individual to their original RF or LF group, Table 8 shows the number of RF and LF subjects scoring within each of these categories group pairings.
for the ToM test questions. The Chi-square test revealed that there was no significant effect of laterality on performance level on either the first or second-order ToM test questions.
Lesion effects
Supplementary analyses were conducted in order to The two frontal groups were again collapsed and regrouped according to size of lesion. The mean diameter of the lesions investigate the effects of site and extent of lesions within the patient groups on performance on the first-and second-order was 3 cm; subjects with lesions of ഛ3 cm were therefore categorized as having small lesions and those with lesions ToM test questions.
The t-test was used to compare overall percentage correct Ͼ3 cm in diameter as having large lesions. Within these categories, subjects were reclassified, according to their scores for both first-order and second-order stories for each class within the patient groups. Scores for all classes of scores, as performing at a high or low level on the first-and second-order ToM test questions (Table 9) . No significant patients with lesions encroaching on individual specific unilateral sectors were compared with those of patients with effects of size were found with the Chi-square test. lesions in other sectors lateralized to the same hemisphere or otherwise, and (more generally) were also compared with those of all other patients. For example, percentage correct
Discussion
This study found that both the RF and the LF groups were scores for patients with lesions incorporating the left dorsolateral sector (n ϭ 7) were compared with those of significantly impaired in ToM ability, as assessed using firstand second-order false belief tests. The relation between patients in the LF group with lesions that did not encroach on the left dorsolateral sector (n ϭ 9), and also with those performance on the ToM test and on control questions within the test, the measures of executive functioning, memory, of all patients (i.e. LF and RF) with lesions that did not encroach on the left dorsolateral frontal sector (n ϭ 24) integration and sequencing, and verbal IQ indicates that this ToM impairment was not artefactual and was independent. (Table 1 ). The classes, defined in terms of individual sectors, were also amalgamated so that all possible unilateral
The control questions in the false belief test and some of the other tests examined whether impaired ToM performance combinations of sectors were represented in a new set of classes. The t-test was then used to compare percentage could be due to a deficit in memory. Frontal patients are impaired on certain tests of verbal memory, including digit correct scores for patients in each of these new classes with those of patients outside these classes. For example, scores span (Janowsky et al., 1989) , free recall of unrelated words (Jetter et al., 1986; Janowsky et al., 1989) and temporal for patients with the largest lesions, incorporating the left dorsolateral, medial and orbital sectors (n ϭ 7) were compared order memory (Milner, 1971; Shimamura et al., 1990) . Nevertheless, such patients are unimpaired on story recall with those of all others in the LF group, with lesions encompassing fewer sectors (n ϭ 9), and with those of all tests (Janowsky et al., 1989; Frisk and Milner, 1990) , which are similar in type to the false belief stories. In the present other (i.e. LF and RF) patients (n ϭ 24). No significant effects were observed. study, frontal patients were also unimpaired on story recall. A deficit in digit span was found, but covariate analysis In addition, effects of laterality and size of lesion were analysed separately. First, the two frontal groups were showed that this could not account for the ToM impairment. Unimpaired performance on the Picture Arrangement test collapsed to form one group, and the mean scores were calculated for correct first-order belief attribution on the firstfurther indicates that it cannot be explained in terms of poor integration and sequencing of story information. This is order ToM test questions and for correct second-order belief attributions on the second-order ToM test questions. The consistent with the lack of impairment in their responses to the memory and fact questions in the false belief test, which mean scores were then used to classify subjects as performing were designed specifically to test comprehension of particular on the basis of other lines of evidence. Grattan and colleagues reported a correlation between performance on measures of facts that contrast with the behaviour of the protagonist and are relevant to his or her implied false belief. mental flexibility and empathy in subjects with frontal lobe damage and in another group of patients with mixed lesions The non-mental state inference questions in the false belief test were included in order to address the suggestion that failure (Grattan and Eslinger, 1989; Grattan et al., 1994) . Furthermore, Hughes and Russell argue that ToM tests are on ToM tests can be due to a type of pragmatic deficit other than impaired ability to conceptualize another person's mental themselves tests of executive function: competition between the subject's own knowledge of story details and the inferred state. Siegal and colleagues reported that RHD subjects could predict behaviour on the basis of a protagonist's false belief false belief of the protagonist may elicit any difficulties the subject may have in inhibiting a prepotent response (Hughes when questions were stated explicitly and unambiguously, but were impaired in their ability to answer ToM test and control and Russell, 1993). Deficits in executive functions, including impaired mental flexibility, are also reported in subjects with questions, seeming to misunderstand, when questions were framed in less explicit language, such that their pragmatic autism, a group who generally fail ToM tests and in whom impaired ToM is believed to explain the core social deficit purpose was only implied (Siegal et al.1996) . RHD adults are known to exhibit difficulties with figurative, non-literal (Ozonoff et al., 1991a; Hughes and Russell, 1993; Hughes et al., 1994) . Indeed, in the present study we found language, and this has been explained in terms of impaired use of pragmatic cues in contextual information (i.e. social and correlations between performance on the ToM test and tests of executive functions, but only for the LF group (on the situational information) that imply meaning. They are thought to have difficulties in integrating information and drawing Stroop test, Part B of the Trail-Making Test, and the WCST for the first-order test, and only on the WCST Percentage of inferences from implied propositions and, therefore, they fail to go beyond concrete, literal interpretations (Brownell et al., Perseverative Errors for the second-order test). However, the important finding from covariate analyses was that these 1986; Foldi, 1987; Weylman et al., 1989) . In interpreting their own findings, Siegal and colleagues concluded that RHD deficits are not necessarily causally related. Deficit in executive functioning does not appear to account for the subjects failed ToM test questions and control questions when a literal interpretation of their meaning was insufficient because ToM impairment in either frontal group; instead, it seems to be an independent deficit. The deficits in executive functions of such an impairment in pragmatic language comprehension. A different patient population was the focus in the present in the LF group may be more importantly related to their impaired performance on the ToM inference questions. investigation, but the inference questions were used to examine the ability to apprehend the meaning implied in contextual Executive functions are likely to be involved in the cognitive operations underpinning the ability to draw inferences from information in stories, and then to explore the relationship between this ability and the ability to answer ToM test the pragmatic implications of a narrative, and studies have indicated that pragmatic impairment is associated with questions. Here, the LF group and not the RF group exhibited impaired performance in answering inference questions cognitive rigidity in RHD (Brownell et al., 1986) and autistic subjects (Ozonoff and Miller, 1996) . appropriately for both first-and second-order ToM stories. However, covariate analyses revealed that this deficit was Further analyses were undertaken to examine the nature of the ToM impairment in the frontal groups. A practice independent of, and therefore could not account for, impaired performance on ToM test questions. This suggests that these effect was found only in the RF group, but this was just on the second-order ToM questions, for the first two stories deficits reflect separate problems, at least in this patient group.
A range of tests of executive functions was employed to presented relative to the subsequent four. The control subjects, from the outset, performed at a markedly higher level than examine the relationship between subjects' performance on these tests and the ToM test. Deficits in the frontal groups both frontal groups, but practice may have enabled RF subjects to develop 'non-ToM' strategies in an attempt to were found, which is consistent with findings in earlier studies. Both the LF and the RF groups demonstrated impaired solve the second-order problems. The use of non-ToM strategies has been suggested as an explanation for the cognitive initiation in verbal fluency (Perret, 1974; Miceli et al., 1981) and impaired monitoring on an externally discrepancy between the observed failure of AS subjects to exhibit ToM ability during informal conversation and their ordered working memory test (Petrides et al., 1993) . Both frontal groups were also impaired on Part A of the Trailtendency to pass classic paradigm ToM tests (Ozonoff et al., 1991b) . Such strategies do not seem to have been available Making Test (simple sequencing), but only the LF group were impaired on Part B, which tests mental flexibility; this to LF subjects as no such effect was found in this group. With regard to the discrepancy in the behaviour of AS is consistent with other studies (e.g. Reitan and Tarshes, 1959) . Only the LF group were impaired on the Stroop subjects, Bowler suggested that theirs might be a failure in the everyday application of ToM rather than competence test and the WCST (Categories Achieved and Percentage Perseverative Errors), which is also in accordance with (Bowler, 1992) . This implies that ToM tests cue the use of an impaired ToM facility, guiding relevant cognitive processes previous findings (Milner, 1971; Drewe, 1974; Perret, 1974) .
Associations between performance on tests of executive that would otherwise be available automatically. If this were so, then it is conceivable that the second-order ToM stories functions and performance on the ToM test might be predicted may act as a stronger trigger than first-order ToM stories.
Fletcher and colleagues and Goel and colleagues isolated activation specific to a ToM task condition in the left medial However, when the level of success for all frontal subjects on the first-order ToM test questions was related to their frontal gyrus (Fletcher et al., 1995; Goel et al., 1995) .
Fletcher and colleagues identified left medial area 8 and Goel level of success on the second-order ToM test questions (defined in terms of correct first-and second-order belief and colleagues identified left medial area 9. This is at odds with a SPECT (single photon emission computed attributions), evidence of improvement in subjects' performance on the second-order ToM test questions was tomography) study by Baron-Cohen and colleagues that used a task with no inference component (Baron-Cohen et al., relatively limited. Instead, first-order ToM responses tended to predict performance on the second-order ToM test questions. 1994). Here, increased activation during performance of a test of recognition of mental state terms was observed in the Indeed, six of the 10 frontal subjects defined as performing at a low level on both the first-and the second-order ToM right orbitofrontal region (relative to the left orbitofrontal and right and left polar frontal regions). These differences in stories made no second-order belief attributions at all, while 10 of the 11 defined as performing at a high level on both prefrontal areas of activation may simply reflect differences in task demands. However, the present study has not clarified the first-and second-order ToM stories made second-order belief attributions in ജ50% of their correct responses. This this issue. Analyses that examined the effects of lateralization, size and site of lesions (in terms of areas of functional suggests that impaired ToM ability, as assessed in this patient population with this test, may largely reflect the degradation significance) failed to localize a specific prefrontal region involved in the attribution of beliefs. An effect of lateralization of a complex ToM system, with severity of impairment related to the degree of degradation.
of lesions might have been expected, and has been reported in earlier studies of the performance of this patient population A current topic of debate is whether ToM ability is critically underpinned by an innate, dedicated, domainon other tasks Morris et al., 1997) ; however, the absence of effects of site or size of lesions is specific cognitive module or mechanism (e.g. The ToM mechanism defined by Leslie, 1987 ) with corresponding perhaps not surprising as many of the lesions were large and most encompassed quite a number of different cytoarchineurological specificity, or subserved solely by domaingeneral, distributed processes. Variability across subjects tectonically defined prefrontal areas. One possible explanation is that ToM ability itself may be too complex to be localized in performance on ToM tests has been reported previously (in an RHD group and in a normal control group; Winner easily. C. Frith has speculated that ToM ability might be underpinned by a suite of frontal cortex modules, each et al., 1998), and this is consistent with the commonly observed variation among individuals in the level of adapted and specialized to represent a different 'propositional attitude' that takes the form of an 'intentional stance' functioning in independent processes (e.g. in spatial ability). In contrast, if content-independent processes are responsible, (Dennett, 1987) , i.e. mental states such as believing, intending, knowing, and being aware (of something) then this presupposes that proficiency is dependent upon experience as this is the only source from which to (C. Frith, 1996) . In practice, the consequences of a ToM impairment or, in develop expertise and, in the case of ToM ability, this is, at least, not intuitively appealing. Evidence of a regular particular, the inability to profit from knowledge which implies that another person holds a false belief, would include developmental sequence in understanding false beliefs in children (Wimmer and Perner, 1983; Perner and Wimmer, misunderstanding other people's behaviour when it is based on false belief. More generally, the ability to make, and take 1985), which seems to apply across cultures (Avis and Harris, 1991) , satisfies some ontogenetic and phylogenetic into account, attributions regarding other people's mental states is crucial in interacting in a socially appropriate and criteria for establishing whether ToM ability is dependent upon a specialized, adaptive, cognitive system. Furthermore, sensitive manner. Difficulties in this regard have been reported repeatedly in case studies of patients with frontal lobe the case of autism, which appears to be characterized by a specific ToM impairment (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) , damage. Their antisocial behaviour has been described in terms of an apparent unintentional insensitivity to social rules with non-social reasoning intact (Baron-Cohen et al., 1993) , does suggest a discrete module, or set of modules, and to the feelings of others; having 'little sense of fairness towards others . . .' but tending to feel victimized (Price vulnerable to selective malfunction.
The present study cannot, in isolation, illuminate whether et al., 1990); and being easily frustrated (Ackerly and Benton, 1948) . Although they may be gregarious, patients with frontal the observed deficit may occur solely with prefrontal cortical lesions as opposed to damage to other brain areas.
lobe lesions tend to be socially isolated to varying degrees and seem to lack the wherewithal to arrive at sound Nevertheless, functional imaging studies provide indirect support for the view that this area has a special role. These judgements and decisions in social situations (Damasio et al., 1991; Saver and Damasio, 1991) . studies have reported a distinct pattern of activation associated with the performance of ToM tests, with critical areas in ToM impairment in patients with frontal lobe lesions can therefore explain social incompetence within the realm the prefrontal cortex, even though they are, collectively, inconclusive as to the specific prefrontal area or areas of 'interactive' social behaviour, as it does in the case of people with autism and Asperger's syndrome (U. Frith, involved. Using PET with slightly different tasks, both (Stone et al., 1998) . A possible Psychiatry 1994; 165: 640-9. alternative interpretation is that adults with acquired frontal lobe lesions may be better equipped to work out non-ToM Bowler DM. 'Theory of mind' in Asperger's syndrome. J Child strategies in order to pass such tests than those with Psychol Psychiatry 1992; 33: 877-93. developmental disorders. Representations of various Brickner RM. The intellectual functions of the frontal lobes: a study elements of social knowledge seem to be preserved (Saver based upon observation of a man after partial bilateral frontal and Damasio, 1991; Swain et al., 1998) (Grattan et al., 1989) and Cornelius and Caspi's EPSI 1987. (Everyday Problem-Solving Inventory) (Dimitrov et al., 1996) , which assess social cognition in more general terms is instantiated in the frontal lobes, and evidence that some of these deficits can co-occur, as in people with autism, must 
